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LITIGATION AND SPECIAL EDUCATION: THE RIGHT OF 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN TO AN EDUCATION AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
The legal rights of the mentally retarded and other 
exceptional children have long been ignored. Suddenly the 
atmosphere changed as a result of cases being brought to 
court on behalf of the mentally retarded, asserting the 
right to education, the right to treatment, and the right 
to proper placement procedures.
Statement of the Problem 
Studies have referred to the growing number of court 
cases which involved handicapped children's rights, but the 
literature revealed no studies which analyzed systematically 
the cases according to their content. The present study 
attempted to answer the question, "What is the relationship 
between the educational systems' alleged abridgement of handi­
capped children's rights and litigation as an avenue for 
change?" In order to provide adequate educational and rehabi­
litation programs for handicapped children, it was necessary 
to understand the evidence presented in the lawsuits concerning 
the handicapped.
2Statement of Purposes
The need for this study arose from the increasing 
importance for educators to understand the relationship of 
the court decisions regarding handicapped children and the 
traditional means of providing treatment and education. The 
purpose of this study was to clarify the nature of this rela­
tionship by an investigation of the legal rights of exceptional 
children.
It was necessary to delineate the areas of focus in the 
lawsuits relating to the rights of the handicapped into three 
major categories. The recognition by the courts that all 
children should be provided free access to an education had 
been one of the central issues in the court cases. Another 
major focus was on the right to treatment for the institution­
alized handicapped. The mass media in the form of television 
coverage, and magazine and newspaper articles exposed inhumane 
treatment in institutions for the mentally retarded and provided 
an impetus for action in this area. The third major area of 
emphasis dealt with the placement practices including the use 
of improper classification of handicapped children. This type 
of litigation was supported by various studies dealing with 
the stigmatization associated with labeling and the justifica­
tion for segregated classes for exceptional children.
The identification of aspects of the court rulings which 
presented problems to the field of special education was another 
major purpose of this study. Decisions by courts and the passage 
of laws alone were not enough for a successful solution to the
3problem. Through a thorough inquiry of all phases of the 
litigation which dealt with handicapped children, educators, 
psychologists, and all those who were involved in the area 
of special education may benefit from such a study.
The importance of conveying legal information to educators 
and uninformed laymen was an essential part of this investi­
gation. Laws relating to education had customarily been 
accepted without question. The legal basis for the lawsuits 
which involved the civil rights of handicapped children 
needed to be established. According to the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States, all people were 
accorded the right to "equal protection under the law and full 
rights of due notice and due process" regarding selection, 
placement, treatment, and retention in educational programs. 
Without laws there would be no financial support for schools 
or no basis for governing education. Educators in recent 
years were forced to become aware of the laws that govern them 
due to recent court decisions and their involvement in the 
management and control of education. Increasingly a need for 
legal research in education was noted.
The implications for the field of special education were 
numerous and complex. The court cases and their decisions 
questioned the historic tradition of education for the handi­
capped as a charitable endeavor. Education as a right required 
a new direction in the thinking of most people toward special 
education. Curriculum matters, resource labs, segregated classes, 
testing procedures, and labeling children were all areas where
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improvement was needed to provide an equal education for 
exceptional children. This study attempted to provide trends 
and implications which educators, legislators, and other 
administrators would implement in theory and practice in 
dealing with exceptional children's rights.
Questions to be Answered
This study was concerned with an attempt to answer the 
following questions:
1. What was the relationship between handicapped 
children's rights and the current litigation?
2. What was the relationship of the court decisions 
regarding handicapped children and the traditional 
means of providing treatment and education?
3. What were the general categories and patterns of 
the existing litigation?
4. What were aspects of the court rulings which pre­
sented problems to the field of special education?
5. What was the legal basis and precedent established 
in the lawsuits regarding the handicapped?
6. What were the arguments presented in the complaints 
that were filed?
7. What were the functions of litigation?
8. What role did state and Federal legislation play 
in the litigation procedure?
9. What were the implications for the leadership in 
the field of special education?
Definition of Terms 
For purposes of this investigation important terms were 
defined in the following manner :
Exceptional Children; includes both the handicapped 
and the gifted; Kirk (1972) defined exceptional children 
as those who:
deviate from the normal child (1) in mental charac­
teristics, (2) in sensory abilities, (3) in neuro­
muscular or physical characteristics, (4) in social 
or emotional behavior, (5) in communication abilities, 
or (6) in multiple handicaps to such an extent that 
requires a modification of school practices, or 
special educational services, in order to develop 
to his maximum capacity (p. 4).
Mental Retardation: according to the American Association
on Mental Deficiency, it is defined as:
subaverage general intellectual functioning which 
originates during the developmental period and is 
associated with impairment in adaptive behavior 
CHeber, 1961, p. 499).
Handicapped Children: defined as those children
. . . who deviate from the average or normal 
child in mental, physical, or social character­
istics to such an extent that he requires a 
modification of school practices or special 
educational services in order to develop his 
maximum capacity (Kirk, 1964, p. 541.
Special Education: Any form of equal educational oppor­
tunity provided for all exceptional children.
Civil Rights: According to Justice Warren (1972) it is
the
rights protected by the Bill of Rights . . .
Freedom of religion, of expression, of association, 
participation in government, the privacy of the home, 
freedom from self-incrimination, and the right to 
civilized procedures before, during and after civil
rights or civil liberties. It also includes those 
arising under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment which requires states to treat 
their citizens equally (p. 14).
Learning Disability; The National Advisory Committee
on Handicapped Children of the United States Office of
Education (1968) states:
Children with specific learning disabilities 
exhibit a disorder in one or more of the basic 
psychological processes involved in understand­
ing or in using spoken or written language. They 
may be manifested in disorders of listening, 
thinking, talking, reading, writing, spelling, 
or arithmetic. They include conditions which 
have been referred to as perceptual handicaps, 
brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia 
and developmental aphasia (p. 14).
Litigation: A lawsuit filed when the "constitutional
or statutory rights" of exceptional children are abridged,
According to Black (1968) it is defined as a "contest
in a court of justice for the purpose of enforcing a
right (p. 1082).'k
Legal Research: According to Mouly (1970) it is subject
to the same requirements as other forms of research. He 
stated:
the task is to summarize statutes, to trace 
further legal developments through related court 
decisions, and to analyze the decision in the 
light of the problem being investigated (p. 229).
Fourteenth Amendment : According to Black (1968),
It recognizes for the first time a citizenship 
of the United States, as distinct from that of 
the States; and secures all 'persons' against 
any state action which is either deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law or denial of the equal protection of the 
laws Cp,rr> 7 85)
7Equal Protection of the Laws ; Black (1968) defined it 
as "extended to persons within its jurisdiction, when 
its courts are open to them on the same conditions as 
to others (p. 631)."
Due Process of Law; "Law in its regular course of admin­
istration through courts of justice (p. 590)," as defined 
by Black (1968).
Limitations
This study was an investigation of the recent court 
rulings from 1967 to 1972 regarding handicapped children. The 
framework for such litigation and prior cases was presented 
when applicable to the legal and civil rights of exceptional 
children. The litigation process occurred in either Federal 
court, in which there was a question arising under the United 
States Constitution or involving parties who are citizens of 
different states, or in state courts which involved the issue 
of state law or practices. Therefore, this study included 
cases at the state and national levels.
Since existing legislation provided much of the basis 
for the litigation, this was examined at both the state and 
Federal levels. In order to show trends in this area, a 
brief summary of pertinent statutes concerning handicapped 
children was included. Education, historically and legally, 
had been a state function with much delegation of responsi­
bility given to the local school districts. Such issues 
regarding mandatory attendance and exclusionary clauses that 
were so important in the lawsuits were provided for in selected
8state laws. It was not the intent of this study to provide 
a comprehensive report of all legislation regarding exceptional 
children.
Procedure
The procedure associated with the collection of the data 
were those involving the location, examination, and analysis 
of available and accessible published materials located in 
libraries and the selected governmental agencies. The first 
source of reference was the United States Constitution, as 
any reference to the laws of the United States was bound 
together by this document. The original case materials, legal 
periodicals, and Federal and state statutes regarding law 
and the handicapped were analyzed for content and importance.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Special education had progressed tremendously since the 
concept of equal access to educational opportunity had its 
beginnings in the mid-nineteenth century. The early state 
institutions for the "feeble-minded" in the United States 
drew on the experimental work of Seguin (1907) and were 
intended as educational and rehabilitative provisions. Blind 
and deaf children were offered specialized training in resi­
dential facilities also during this period (Goldberg, 1971; 
Wallin, 1924). However, special educational services within 
the public school system appeared early in the twentieth 
century with teachers assigned to classes as early as 1895 
in Providence, Rhode Island, for the mentally retarded 
CLippman and Goldberg, 1973). According to Wallen (1924) 
the first classes for the physically handicapped (1899) and 
blind (1900) were established in the Chicago public schools.
In 1893 in Massachusetts, a court ruled that a student 
could be expelled if he displayed continuous disorderly conduct 
either voluntarily or by reason of embicility (Watson v. City 
of Cambridge, 1893). School officials decided upon what 
constituted disorderly conduct. Another decision was handed 
down in the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Beattie v. State Board 
of Education, 1919, which held that a school could exclude 
a child if his presence had "a deleterious effect on the other
10
children or teachers." Students were expelled if they
displayed continuous disorderly conduct or had a 
depressing and nauseating effect on the teachers 
and school children. The rights of a child of 
school age to attend the schools of the state could 
not be insisted upon, when its presence therein is 
harmful to the best interest of the school (Beattie
V .  State Board of Education, 1919, p. 231).
These court rulings laid the basis for the schools to make 
decisions which have kept many disabled or deviant children 
out of the public schools (Mann and Sabatino, 1973).
The 1960's began years of executive leadership at the na­
tional level when President John F. Kennedy gathered more 
public concern with the organization of the President's Panel 
on Mental Retardation in 1961. According to Jones (1968), 
President Kennedy stated, "For the nation, increasing the 
quality and availability of education is vital to both our 
national security and our domestic well being (p. 15)."
Kennedy then outlined the role of the Federal government in 
regard to education:
All this has not been enough. And the Federal govern­
ment has clearly not met 'its responsibilities in educa­
tion. It has not offered sufficient help to our 
present educational system to meet its inadequacies 
and overcome its obstacles (Jones, p. 15).
United States Commissioner of Education Sidney P. Marland
summarized the mood of this era of special education in a speech
in the opening session of the 49th Convention of the Council
for Exceptional Children:
The right of a handicapped child to the special educa­
tion he needs is as basic to him as the right of any 
other young citizen to an appropriate education in the 
public schools. It is unjust for our society to provide 
handicapped children with anything less than a full and 
equal educational opportunity they need to reach their 
maximum potential and attain rewarding, satisfying lives
(p. 87).
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Tracing the labels placed on the handicapped revealed 
the public attitude toward them as Doll (1955), a major con­
tributor to the education of the mentally retarded, said;
Changes are reflected in new modes of expression which 
indicate the alteration in thinking and values. As 
the term 'feeble-minded* gave place to ’mentally 
deficient,* so this in turn has changed to 'mental 
retardation * (p. 45).
Martin (1970), Associate Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Education for the Handicapped, expressed his philosophy of 
education for the handicapped in the 1970*s when he stated 
tha^ "education is an inalienable right and not a gift to be 
bestowed upon the handicapped by those of us who are not 
handicapped (p. 10)." The Associate Commissioner expressed 
the opinion that too many people see it as charitable enter­
prise instead of a right of the handicapped.
A Declaration of General and Special Rights of the Mentally 
Retarded was adopted in 1968 by the International League of 
Societies for the Mentally Handicapped. Article I of this 
resolution stated, "The mentally retarded person has the same 
basic rights as other citizens of the same country and same 
age (p. 10)." This document gave support and recognition to 
the concept of rights for the handicapped and it was later 
included in a resolution adopted by the United Nations. General 
Assembly (see Appendix A).
Smith (1973), President of the American Bar Association, 
stated that "the plight of the mentally disabled is among 
the saddest and most alarming problems facing our society" 
and that the ABA had begun an "action program to correct the
12
*widespread deprivation of civil rights of those in insti­
tutions' (p. 3639)." Among the "action oriented" activities 
considered by the American Bar was the investigation of the 
rights of retarded children to have a specialized, public- 
supported education, as mandated by the recent court decisions 
(Smith, 1973). The interest in the rights of handicapped 
spread throughout the legal profession and became a cause for 
many public interest attorneys.
The concept of special education has been modified 
drastically since the 1900's, and the present state was best 
presented in a policy statement adopted by the Council for 
Exceptional Children in 1971 which stated:
Education is the.right of all children. The principle 
of education for all is based on the philosophical 
premises of democracy that every person is valuable in 
his own right and should be afforded equal opportunities 
to develop his full potential. . . Because of their 
exceptionality, many of the children need to begin 
their school experiences at earlier ages than are 
customary for children in our society, many need formal 
educational services well into adulthood, and many 
require health and social services that are closely 
coordinated with school programs (p. 104).
The early 1970's was the period when exceptional children
demanded their rights along with other minority groups who
had been denied their civil rights. As evidenced by the
material cited, the public gave its support and interest to
the handicapped in the securing of their rights. This decade
appears to be the era of litigation and decisions by the
judiciary as to the legal rights of the handicapped regarding
education.
Although progress had been made regarding the provision
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of educational services for the handicapped, the majority of 
such persons were denied an appropriate educational program 
within the mainstream of public education. According to 
Trudeau, Nye, and Bolick (1973), initial identification of 
handicapped children was accomplished through three procedures —  
census, screening, and referral. The United States Office of 
Education —  Bureau of Education for the Handicapped indicated 
that as of July 1, 1968, there were approximately 75 million 
children in the United States between the ages of 0-19 years 
of age. Of these children approximately 7,083,500 were handi­
capped. The seven million children were categorized and 
reported in Table 1.
Studies by the United States Office of Education (USOE) 
reported that 12 percent of all handicapped children received 
special educational services in 1948. By 1963, the population 
increased to 21 percent; by 1967 to 33 percent, and by 1971 to 
40 percent CWeintraub, Abeson, and Braddock, 1971). Stated in 
other terms, 60 percent of the handicapped were not receiving 
the special education services they needed. Categories of 
children served and unserved as identified by the United States 
Office of Education —  Bureau of Education for the Handicapped 
in the 1971-72 school year were reported in Table 2. The per­
centage of children receiving services in the various states 
ranged from 80 percent in Washington to 10 percent in Arkansas 
as reported by the USOE (1971-72).
Many handicapped children could remain an economic liability 
to the state without appropriate educational opportunity. If
14
they became productive citizens they could contribute econo­
mically and socially to the country. It was estimated that 
one million handicapped had not received educational oppor­
tunities due to provisions in compulsory school attendance 
laws which exclude them from public education (Weintraub e^ al., 
1971). Judicial interpretations in the future may prove or 
disprove the constitutionality of these compulsory attendance 
laws (Handicapped Children’s Education Project, 1973).
Three pertinent issues were involved in the lawsuits that 
were filed on behalf of handicapped children’s rights according 
to Cruickshank (1972): included were educational placement
and labeling, psychodiagnosis, and parental involvement in the 
educational process. Cruickshank (1972) noted that the plain­
tiffs were dissatisfied with the school system and charged 
psychologists and educators with violation of the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti­
tution. Parents stated in these lawsuits that the concept of 
special education was unfavorable to equality. The courts 
agreed with Ross, DeYoung, and Cohen (1971) when they stated.
Once a child is improperly placed in a class, there is 
little chance that the student will leave it. Insuffi­
cient attention is given to the development of basic 
educational skills and retesting occurs infrequently if 
ever. Contributing further to the lack of . . . mobility 
is the student’s self-image which is formed by improper 
placement and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of low 
achievement (p. 10).
Educational officials in many instances ignored the parents 
or concerned citizens and their own colleagues regarding inade­
quacies in practices concerning special education. Since the 
regular channels were not successful, there was the unusual
15
occurence in the United States of the judicial system being 
asked to determine for educators the proper direction in the 
education of exceptional children.
It was obvious that there was a real need for educators, 
especially those involved in the education of the handicapped, 
to implement and understand the law in regard to the legal 
rights of the children and their parents. Vergason (1973) 
suggested that the legal actions be viewed as one form of 
accountability against the system. He warned that the next 
step may be against the individual teachers. Many educators 
ignored the requests of their students and fellow colleagues 
in regard to the issues involved in the courts. Therefore, 
the courts were forced to assume the responsibility of inter­
vention into the educational needs of exceptional children.
The profession itself must assume the responsibility of 
improvement of programs and practices to meet the needs of 
the individual child if there is to be successful implemen­
tation of court orders.
According to Murdock (1972), there was no question that 
the equal protection clause applied to eligibility for public 
educational programs. In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 
it stated that "Such an opportunity, where the state has under­
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on equal terms (p. 483)." The real groundwork for the 
litigation that followed was laid in this famous landmark 
case, Brown v. Board of Education (1954), when the Supreme 
Court of the United States overturned earlier decisions that 
upheld "separate but equal" educational facilities for children
16
of different races. This 1354 decision asserted:
Education is required in the performance of our most 
basic responsibilities. . .  It is doubtful that any 
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
if he is denied the opportunity of an education Cp. 483).
This premises, as applied to handicapped children, was not 
tested in the courts for another sixteen years.
The use of the courts did not assure that exceptional 
children would be provided their constitutional rights.
Gilhool (1973a) suggested that lawyers and non-lawyers 
mistakenly viewed the courts as creating and maintaining 
rights, and he delineated the functions of litigation into 
four major areas.
The first area involved the securing of access to educa­
tion in which "zero-reject education" was the goal. Essential 
to this was the argument that every exceptional child was 
capable of benefiting from an education, and as Gilhool (1973) 
noted, "There is no such thing as an uneducable and untrainable 
child (p. 803)."
The second function was the creation of a new forum 
where advocates of children with handicaps had the right to 
be heard. This took the form of the due process hearing 
before an educational assignment of any exceptional child 
was made or changed. If the parent requested, the child and 
parent were entitled to notice and the opportunity to be 
heard. This provided a hearing for the teacher, psychologist, 
and administrator to request the delivery of services to 
meet the individual child’s educational need. The parents
17
were thus enabled to hold the schools accountable in a 
formal way for the proper education of their children and 
to be directly involved in the placement.
The next use of litigation was the delivery of informa­
tion to the public. The idea that retarded citizens had 
rights was entirely new to some people, and the news coverage 
of the landmark cases perpetuated their use as an attention- 
gathering supportive device.
The final function of litigation was in the expression 
of one's self and the improvement of the self concept. A 
new language developed in regard to handicapped children in 
which parents and children no longer accepted the relegation 
to second-class citizenship. They viewed themselves as 
entitled to the same rights afforded other children. Gilhool 
(1973) stated it as:
. . .  a conception that suggests that handicapped 
citizens no longer have by the grace or by the good 
will of any other person but that they have what 
they must have by right. It is now a question of 
justice (p. 609).
The investigations revealed a change in public attitude 
since the question of education of the exceptional individual 
arose in the mid-nineteenth century. Before this time, 
mentally retarded persons were viewed much like prisoners 
and were isolated from the public. As special educational 
services developed in the public schools and in institutions, 
some early rulings favored expulsion of those students who 
were disabled or deviant. As the studies indicated, there 
was a shift in attitudes toward exceptional children beginning
18
in the 1360's with executive leadership and continuing in the 
1970's with judicial interpretation of handicapped children's 
rights. Throughout the literature, it was reiterated that 
over half of the handicapped children were not receiving the 
benefit of the special education services that they needed.
At the center of the discussion in these studies was the 
principle which asserted the right to an education as an 
inalienable right of all children, including those who were 
handicapped. Most of the investigations demonstrated that 
if traditional modes of providing access to these rights were 
not successful, the handicapped children and their parents 
must turn to the courts for a solution to their problems. 
However, this was considered to be the last alternative in 
seeking the rights of the handicapped, and legislation was 
viewed as an avenue to be pursued before litigation. The 
functions of litigation were reviewed in order to place the 
outcome of the court decisions in their proper perspective.
State and Federal Legislation
The passage of new state and Federal legislation was a
major portion of the growing trend to provide equal rights
to the education of the handicapped.
What happens to handicapped children in this decade 
will depend a great deal on the roles that the special 
educator is willing to play outside the school as well 
as his behaviors within the school. Our past suggests 
we have needed to work as citizens, joining with the 
parents of handicapped children and with other concerned 
citizens to influence public priorities, urge school 
boards to support programs, and influence legislators 
to pass state and Federal laws (p. 517).
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These comments by Martin (1972), Associate Commissioner- 
of the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped, reaffirmed 
the conviction that the accomplishment of educational oppor­
tunities for all handicapped children had its roots in the 
establishment of a strong legal basis.
In the past few years the groundwork had been developing 
to such a point that Abeson (1972) described the positive 
change occurring at all levels of government as a "movement."
In addition to the passage of state and Federal legislation, 
there were attorney generals * opinions and court rulings 
establishing the right to an education and treatment for the 
handicapped child. Abeson (1972) indicated that although 
some progress had been taking place for years, it had only 
been recently that the volume of activity had increased to 
the amount which can be described as a movement.
Traditionally, America’s schools were controlled by the 
local school district under the jurisdiction of state laws.
Since the United States Constitution made no immediate reference 
to education, the fifty states included constitutional provi­
sions for it. The local districts became more dependent on 
the state partially as a result of the growing reliance on 
the state financially. However, although state constitutions 
provided for education to the children of their states, many 
states enacted statutory provisions enabling school authorities 
to exclude certain children from a free public education 
(Weintraub e;t al. , 1971). A clear picture of this was reported 
by Abeson and Weintraub (1971):
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Mark Miner, William Topez and Martha Lynd are all 
legal residents of a state and are school aged 
handicapped children. Mark is mentally retarded;
William is severly physically handicapped; and 
Martha is emotionally disturbed. Through the 
actions of the state and local education officials, 
these children have been excluded from school atten­
dance on the basis of being ’unable to profit’ from 
such experiences. As a result of the state laws 
which eliminates these children from public school,
Mark and Martha are receiving no education at all 
and William is enrolled in a private school with 
tuition paid solely by his parents (p. 59).
The services that were available to the nation’s handi­
capped ranged from total exclusion to the appropriate place­
ment based on the child’s individual needs. Scattered through­
out this range were full time special class placement, resource 
labs, itenerant teachers, speech therapists, work-study, and 
the residential setting. All of these services were left up 
to the various states’ discretion, and this had created a 
state of confusion within the states as to what provisions 
needed to be provided.
The litigation issue touched on all aspects of programming, 
curriculum, and administration. The idea that a ’’classifica­
tion system based on specific learning needs of children and 
more flexible programs in the form of contracts received 
support (Gallagher, 1972; Blatt, 1972). The opinion that some 
handicapped children were better educated in the regular 
class setting received support in the lawsuits. The term 
"mainstrearning” was used in reference to this practice and 
seemed to be indicative of the future trends in special educa­
tion. As was evidenced by the President’s Committee on 
Mental Retardation in The Six Hour Retarded Child (1970),
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many of the children in special education came from low- 
income and minority group families and were possibly 
improperly classified. Compensatory education received 
much support in that such efforts were proved effective in 
some instances (Meier, 1971).
In 1963, the United States Office of Education began 
to systematically estimate nursery school and kingergarten 
enrollments of all exceptional children (weintraub e^ ,
1971). The Head Start programs were useful in the identi­
fication of young children with handicaps. The whole idea 
of pre-school programming was opened in the litigation of 
right to education lawsuits. Legislation changed the minimum 
age levels required to as early as birth for special educa­
tion services in some states. As Cruickshank and Johnson 
(1958) reported:
Early discovery, implemented by legal provisions 
which make early treatment and related services 
possible, will mean less children in special educa­
tion in the public schools and at the least will 
mean that special education will be in a better 
position to serve exceptional children when they 
do come into the elementary schools (p. 256).
Within state laws, the most statutes listed categories
of children who were eligible and generally stated maximum
and minimum age ranges. According to Abeson and Trudeau
(1973), if a specific category of handicapped children were
absent from the state definition, it did not mean that
services were not provided to those children. The rules
and regulations of the state refined and interpreted the
definitions to be more general and inclusive. Presented
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in Appendix B was an overview of the definitions of the 
handicapped and the age requirements in the fifty states as 
reported by Abeson and Trudeau (1973).
Weintraub et , (1971) indicated that the institutional 
provisions establishing public education focused on three 
areas of emphasis: (a) establishing the educational enterprise,
(b) educating children, or Cc) disclaiming responsibility 
for the education of certain handicapped persons. As a result 
of the exclusionary clauses, according to the prevalance 
statistics, approximately one million handicapped children 
were denied any form of education.
To help alleviate this problem, most of the states 
passed mandatory legislation (Abeson, 1972). The first 
states with mandatory laws establishing education programs 
for handicapped children were New Jersey (1911), New York 
(1917), and Massachusettes (1920) according to Trudeau (1972). 
Currently forty-eight states had mandatory provisions while 
only North Carolina and Vermont retained permissive legisla­
tion. It was not suggested that passage of mandatory legis­
lation was a general panacea. Legislation without enforce­
ment had little value and therefore generally the states 
which had mandatory legislation did not have greater per­
centages of handicapped receiving an education than those 
with permissive legislation. In the cases where advocates 
of children's rights sought to secure these rights and found 
no enforcement of these mandatory laws, the only source of 
relief was to seek action on the part of the courts.
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Many states enacted comprehensive special education 
legislation which required the state to assume greater 
responsibility for educating all handicapped children. More 
emphasis was placed on diagnostic and evaluative services 
which were intended to meet the individual needs of each 
child. These states according to Weintraub (1972) were 
Arkansas, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and North Dakota. These states progressed beyond 
the issue of whether or not to require programs for the 
handicapped and were considering research findings regarding 
appropriate education for these children. Some states were 
moving toward lowering the minimum school age entrance to 
birth (State-Federal Information Clearinghouse for Exceptional 
Children, 1972). At the other end it was recognized by some 
states that handicapped youth needed extended services , and 
they have raised the maximum school age eligibility to 21 
years or no maximum age level at all. Whether or not the 
state took such age initiatives was largely left in the hands 
of special educators, parents, and most importantly, legis­
lators .
It was clearly indicated that state legislation was an 
essential ingredient in securing the rights of handicapped 
children. The change of attitude in public opinion and 
governmental action was epitomized by the decision in 1968 
of the Fourth Congress of the International Congress of the 
International League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped 
to adopt as its theme, "From Charity To Rights." Public
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education as a charitable endeavor did not include any 
responsibility. According to Weintraub e;t al., (1971), the 
issue facing government was not whether handicapped children 
were entitled to an education, but how government can make 
such an education a reality.
Although state legislation had been a driving force in 
the struggle for the rights of the handicapped, the Federal 
government provided needed financial support and an impetus 
to state programs that were falling behind. Theoretically, 
all of the governmental agencies on all levels cooperated 
to improve the needed resources and services.
The Federal role in educational services for the handi­
capped started with Galludet College in 1864 and the American 
Printing House for the Blind in 1879. Over the next two 
decades, the number of Federal programs grew at an amazing 
pace. Due to the number and complexity of these Federal 
programs, only the most significant were included in this 
study.
Since 1956, the United States Office of Education had 
become a strong influence in special education. The field 
of special education served as an example to other areas in 
education in demonstrating how Federal, state and local 
governments worked together. According to Reynolds (1969), 
the United States Office of Education started its Cooperative 
Research Program in 1957 with an appropriation of one million 
dollars, and was expanded through Title IV of Public Law 89-10, 
In 1969 the United States Office of Education created a new
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Bureau of Education for the Handicapped which coordinated 
the activities of the Federal government in the field. It 
was divided into three major divisions: Division of Educa­
tional Services, Division of Training Programs, and Division 
of Research.
The passage of programs under President John F. Kennedy 
for personnel working with the mentally retarded and the deaf 
established a framework for the enactment of additional 
programs to help other types of handicapped children requiring 
special education (Carey, 1971). President Kennedy’s Mental 
Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers 
Construction Act of 1963, P. L. 88-164,also provided an 
impetus for further programs.
Title III, which was part of P. L. 88-164, provided for 
the training of teachers of all handicapped children in addition 
to personnel in the areas of mental retardation and deafness. 
Grants for research and demonstration projects relating to 
education of handicapped children were included in Title III.
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (P. L. 
89-10), Title I , provided direct assistance for education of 
handicapped children. Title I was a program of Federal grants 
to the states for allocation to school districts with children 
in low-income families. Funds were made available to projects 
within the local educational program for "educationally dis­
advantaged children" which Congress expanded to include handi­
capped children. As Carey (1971) noted, most of the assistance 
was going to the general education community, and it would
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be necessary to provide a more direct source for the handi­
capped .
Title VI) Education for Handicapped Children, was created 
by P. L. 89-750 in 1966 as amendments to the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act. This provided grants for aiding 
states in the initiation, expansion and improvement of programs 
for the education of handicapped children at preschool, elemen­
tary, and secondary levels. This ESEA Amendment established 
a National Advisory Committee on the Handicapped. The 1969 
ESEA Amendments, P. L. 91-230, extended the main aid programs 
and created a program of special grants for research, training 
and the establishment of model centers for the education of 
children with specific learning disabilities. It provided 
for early education for handicapped children and as such repealed 
P. L. 90-538, The Hahdicapped Children’s Early Education 
Assistance Act of 1968. This piece of legislation was a land­
mark because it was the first time in history that Congress 
approved an action exclusively for education of all handicapped 
without attaching to it any other legislation (LaVor, 1969). 
Definitions of handicapped children and children with specific 
learning disabilities were included. Martin, La Vor, Bryan, 
and Scheflin (1970) reported that a special feature of the 
Title VI package was the fact that it cemented newly created 
and existing legislation into a single statute and thus 
recognized the distinctiveness of the handicapped as a major 
target population.
Five years following the passage of P. L. 88-210, the
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Vocational Education Act of 1963, it became apparent that 
only minimal vocation education resources were made available 
to the handicapped (Forsythe and Weintraub, 1969). Therefore, 
on October 16, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into 
law Public Law 90-576, the Vocational Education Amendments of 
1968. This required that at least 10 percent of each state's 
allotment of funds appropriated was to be used only for voca­
tional education for the handicapped. A National Advisory 
Council on Vocational Education was created and had one member 
of the Council experienced in the education and training of 
handicapped persons (Trudeau, 1972). State advisory councils 
were set up and were to be appointed by the elected state 
board of education or by the governor.
The Economic Opportunities Amendments of 1972, P. L.
92-424, stated that the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare must establish policies and procedures to assure that 
at least 10 percent of the enrollments in the Head Start 
program were available for handicapped children. According 
to La Vor (1972), this act made eligible almost 38,000 handi­
capped children, 3, 4 and 5 years old, and allowed them to 
participate in Head Start programs whereas for seven years 
handicapped children had been excluded from participating.
The cutback in funds for Federal programs had an impact 
on the direction of special education in 1972. However, the 
recent passage of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, P. L.
93-112, at the end of 1973 was a step forward in providing 
equal rights to the handicapped. This legislation provided
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for no discrimination in employment because of a handicapping 
condition. According to this law, there can be no discrimin­
ation in Federal programs or Federal grants, and employees 
must take affirmative action in recourse for any past dis­
crimination.
Behind the Federal legislation passed for the benefit 
of the handicapped was the question of funding. As the pro­
grams grew, they reached the 200 million dollar level, which 
was approximately thirty dollars per child. This was still 
not adequate and it was suggested by Carey (1971) that the 
future Federal role should include basic support on a shared 
basis with the state and local governments.
If adequate state and national legislation existed, a 
judicial interpretation would not have been required. However, 
much reform had been occurring at the state and national level, 
and the passage of laws did not guarantee enforcement or 
acceptance on the part of the public. In many of the lawsuits 
filed, state laws existed guaranteeing the rights of handi­
capped, but had not been enforced. It was beyond the scope 
of this study to report all of the legislation regarding 
education of the handicapped, but legislative trends and 
important statutes were provided.
CHAPTER III 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CHILD
When the constitutional or statutory rights of exceptional 
children were violated, litigation was implemented as one 
means to obtain those rights. Litigation was regarded as the 
last avenue of legal intervention due to the tremendous expense 
and the length of the procedure. Such actions as legislation 
and administrative redress were exhausted before the issue was 
brought to the courts.
Going to the courts was not a new or unique occurrence. 
Gilhool (1973) suggested that the use of the courts to secure 
one's rights was not really different from the things that 
had been done for decades. He stated it was essentially 
that ”. . . w e  are after our rights Cp. 599).” The courts 
pointed out that the government cannot grant services to 
some and withhold them from others. For many years professionals 
and parents' movements recognized that no child is truly unedu- 
cable, and the legal profession took this issue to the courts 
for action. The atmosphere and attitudes on the part of 
concerned parties and the general public permitted the success­
ful use of the courts in obtaining the full rights of handi­
capped citizens. Abeson (1973a) suggested that the combination 
of litigation, legislation, and public awareness created a 
climate throughout the country that led school districts to 
independently halt discriminatory practices.
29
According to Martin (1972), former United States Commis­
sioner of Education Sidney P. Marland set in 1971 the goal of 
full educational opportunity for all handicapped children by 
1980. This implied that these children had only quasi-rights, 
but; as a result of recent court decisions, the right to an 
education was not to be postponed. Education of the handi­
capped had always been considered by the educational system 
to be a frill to be taken care of after every other school 
need had been met (Weintraub and Abeson, 1972). The Task 
Force on Law of the President's Panel on Mental Retardation 
(1963) set forth the principle that "our basic position is 
that all rights normally held by anyone are also held by the 
retarded (p. 12)." This principle was extended to all 
exceptional or handicapped persons with the recent litigation 
procedures.
A study by Allen (1968) gave support to the idea that
many inequities existed in the judicial system in regard to
mentally handicapped persons when he noted:
It is as true today as it was 250 years ago, that 
that cornerstone of our legal system, equal justice 
under law, will remain a half truth unless it 
embraces as well that concept of equity, equal 
justice for the inherently unequal (p. 642).
Right to Education 
On January 7, 1971, fourteen retarded children with the 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (P.A.R.C.) 
sued for themselves and for all the retarded children in 
Pennsylvania or in legal terms "all others similarly situated," 
who had been denied equal access to education. Pennsylvania
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Association for Retarded Children v . Commonwealth of Pennsyl­
vania (1971) was the landmark case in the right to education 
lawsuits that followed. The defendants were the state secretaries 
of education and public welfare, the state board of education, 
and thirteen school districts.
The Pennsylvania School Code provided an education to 
all children and even included the exceptional, but despite 
this, large numbers of retarded children had been denied access 
to schooling (Gilhool, 1973). The plaintiffs charged that 
they represented as many as 53,000 people (Cohen and DeYoung,
1973).
The suit, heard by a three-judge panel, questioned public 
policy as expressed in law regarding the denial of free access 
to educational opportunities to the mentally retarded of school 
age. The case was scheduled for a hearing on a preliminary 
injunction on August 12, 1971. Expert witnesses testified 
and provided the essence of the case: the truth of the
assertion that all retarded children regardless of the label 
can benefit from education and training. Another important 
segment of the expert testimony was the process of education 
defined as a continuous process by which individuals learn 
to cope and function with their environment. Thus, education 
was not defined exclusively as the provision of academic 
experiences. After the testimony from four of the expert 
witnesses, the defendants called a halt and announced they 
wished to settle the case.
The October, 1971, injunction required that:
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1. To provide as soon as possible but in no event 
later than September 1, 1972, to every retarded 
person between the ages of six and twenty-one, 
access to a free public program of education and 
training appropriate to his learning capacities.
2. To provide as soon as possible but in no event 
later than September 1, 1972, wherever defendants 
provide a pre-school program of education and 
training for children aged less than six years of 
age, access to a free, public program of education 
and training appropriate to his learning capacities 
to every mentally retarded child of the same age.
3. The Secretary of Education shall be responsible 
for assuring that every mentally retarded child 
is placed in a program of education and training 
appropriate to his.learning capacities, and to 
that end . . .  he shall be informed as to the 
identity, condition, and educational status of 
every mentally retarded child within the various 
school districts (p. 1253).
In order to assure prompt and expedient implementation, 
the consent agreement required the state to develop a plan for 
finding retarded children and a plan for providing educational 
opportunities and services. It required a notice to parents 
of retarded children of the court action. To facilitate quick 
action, the court appointed two Masters from the field of 
education and law, who represented the court in carrying out 
orders and injunctions. These orders were to be completed 
by September, 1972, when all retarded children between the 
ages of six and twenty-one were to be provided a publicly- 
supported education. On May 5, 1972, the June and October 
decrees were approved and adopted and were put into full 
effect.
Thus, judicial recognition had been made that all children 
ware educable. and that all retarded children should have
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access to the benefits of public school. The underlying
principle in the right to education cases, stated as "zero
reject" by Lilly (1970), meant that every child was entitled
to proper placement in the educational system. Those who
disputed this principle took the position that such an
implementation would cost more than was beneficial. Murdock
(1972) concluded that:
Such a position cannot be justified legally, economi­
cally, or morally. From a legal standpoint, consti­
tutional rights may not be abridged because implemen­
tation requires expenditure of public funds (p. 170).
As reported earlier in this study, it was estimated that 
one million children were excluded from public school instruc­
tion. The P.A.R.C. case established handicapped children's 
right to education. Goldberg and Lippman (1974) extended 
this principle and referred to right to education as
. . .  an integral part of universal human beings as 
members of the human race. Right to education is 
really the keystone of the dignity of man (p. 326).
The National Association for Retarded Children CN.A.R.C.)
reaffirmed this belief in their 1971 policy statement:
Many mentally retarded children are frequently denied 
education in public schools because of their projected 
inability to contribute tangibly to society, while 
others are excluded because they do not possess suffi­
cient behavioral controls and/or self-care and verbal 
skills to make them readily amenable to traditional 
school curricula, physical facilities, and competencies 
of teaching personnel.
Public school education must be provided for all 
mentally retarded persons, including the severally 
and profoundly retarded. There should be no dividing 
line which excludes children from public education 
services. If current educative technologies and 
facilities are inappropriate for the education of 
some retarded persons, then these existing educational 
regimes should be modified (p. 2).
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Another landmark decision was reached involving the
right to education cases in Mills v . Board of Education (1972).
The parents and guardians of seven District of Columbia
children brought this class action suit against the District
for failure to provide a free public school education. The
defendants answered that the reason they failed to provide
such an education was the lack of necessary fiscal resources.
On August 1, 1972, Judge Joseph C. Waddy issued a final
order and opinion in which he supported all the arguments
brought by the plaintiffs. This decision applied to all
handicapped children and not just a single category. The
Mills case thus expanded the principles of the Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
(1971) to all handicapping conditions and while P.A.R.C. was
decided upon by a consent agreement, the Mills case provided
a constitutional holding reached by a Federal judge in a
contested case and set even a stronger precedent (Mental Health
Law Project, 1973).
Judge Waddy held that the defendants could not be excused
by a claim of insufficient funds in his statement:
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all 
of the services and programs that are needed in the 
system then the available funds must be expended 
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely 
excluded from a publicly supported education consistent 
with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom.
The inadequacies of the District of Columbia Public 
School System, whether occasioned by insufficient 
funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly 
cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the 
'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the 
normal child (p. 47).
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The Court ordered the District to offer educational 
facilities within 30 days and required the School Board to 
develop a written plan for special education services and 
to identify those children within 45 days.
The following right to education lawsuits concerned the 
most important legal activities regarding not only mentally 
retarded persons, but all handicapped children in their 
pursuit of an appropriate education. This right was extremely 
inclusive and it pertained to the educational and civil rights 
of a diverse group of handicapped children. Only 2.8 million 
or 40 percent of today's seven million exceptional children 
received special education services (Weintraub and Abeson,
1972). These figures revealed inadequate and unconstitutional 
treatment towards millions of handicapped children. The
I
right to education lawsuits shifted the emphasis to the 
responsibility of the state to allocate funds equitably and 
provide special educational services to all handicapped 
children. The plaintiffs were usually the more severly 
handicapped or the ghetto school children who had been 
excluded or misplaced in special education.. The effects of 
legislation that was not enforced or lack of appropriate 
types of legislation were evidenced by the exclusion of many 
children. The legal basis for exclusion had been based on 
compulsory attendance laws, and as discussed early in this 
study and supported by Weintraub and Abeson (1972), these 
laws became "compulsory non-attendance laws (p. 1045)."
In 1959 a decision by Judge D. Frank Wilkens, Third
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Judicial District Court of Utah, handed down a decision which 
required two trainable mentally retarded children who had 
been excluded from education to be provided an education 
within the public education system (Wolf v. Legislature of 
State of Utah, 1969). These children, who were the responsi­
bility of the State Department of Welfare, guaranteed the 
right to education at public expense to all children in the 
state. Judge Wilkens noted:
Today it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
right and opportunity of an education. In the instant 
case the segregation of the plaintiff children from 
the public school system has a detrimental effect 
upon the children as well as their parents. The 
impact is greater when it has the apparent sanction 
of the law. The policy of placing these children 
under the Department of Welfare and segregating them 
from the educational system can be and probably is 
usually interpreted as denoting their inferiority, 
unusualness, and incompetency. A sense of inferiority 
and not belonging affects the motivation of a child 
to learn. Segregation, even though perhaps well 
intentioned, under the apparent sanction of law and 
state authority has a tendency to retard the educa­
tional, emotional, and mental development of the 
children (Wolf v. Legislature of the State of Utah,
1 9 6 9 1 ,
Doe V .  Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee 
(1970) was one of two suits filed in Wisconsin in 1970. In 
this class action suit the plaintiffs were represented by John 
Doe, a 14 year old trainable mentally retarded student. John 
Doe had been tested by a school board psychologist who deter­
mined him as eligible for placement in a class for the trainable 
mentally retarded. He was placed on a waiting list and the 
plaintiffs alleged that this was a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. A temporary injunction was ordered and
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the public schools were prohibited from placing trainable 
mentally retarded children on a waiting list for special 
education. It also required the public schools to admit 
the plaintiffs into the program for trainable mentally 
retarded children with reasonable speed which was 15 days•
Marlega v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors (1970) 
was a class action suit with Douglas Marlega as the plaintiff. 
He was excluded from public school attendance because of 
medical reasons involving hyperactivity without affording 
the parents or guardians an opportunity to contest the 
validity of the exclusion determination. A temporary restrain­
ing order was awarded on January 14, 1970, and on March 16, 
1970, the Court ordered that no child could be excluded from 
a free public education on a full time basis without a due 
process hearing. This due process hearing included (a) speci­
fication of the reasons for exclusion; Cb) a prior hearing;
(c) the rights to be represented by counsel, to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence and witnesses 
on the child’s behalf; Cd) a stenographic record of the hear­
ing; Ce) a final decision in writing stating in detail the 
reasons for any exclusion; and (f) a specification of available 
public education alternatives (Cohen and DeYoung, 1973).
One right to education case, Reid v. New York Board of 
Education (1971), was decided in favor of the defendants due 
to the decision that a state court could provide an adequate 
remedy, and a decision by the Federal courts was unnecessary.
A subsequent decision had not been made in this case brought
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before the state of New York in Reid v. Board of Education.
This class action suit was brought in Federal court to prevent 
the New York Board of Education from denying brain-injured 
children an appropriate education. It was alleged that over 
4-00 children in New York City, identified as brain damaged, 
had not received placement because of a final screening pro­
cedure and an additional 200 children were placed on a waiting 
list. In the new complaint the petitioner represented nine 
school age children with learning disabilities attributed to 
brain injury and/or emotional disturbance and they represented 
a class estimated to be 20,000 children. The children ranged 
in ages seven to twelve and had varied school histories which 
included misplacement, medical suspensions, home instruction, 
and assignments to waiting lists. The petition sought 
diagnosis and evaluation of all handicapped children and 
provision of complete educational services to this class of 
children. The decision was still pending before the New York 
Commissioner of Education.
The plaintiffs in McMillan v. Board of Education of State 
of New York (1970) were brain-injured children. They sought 
an injunction prohibiting a $2,000 ceiling on state payments 
for children in private schools and in addition included 
request for provision of special classes in the public schools. 
Cohen and DeYoung (1973) reported that the technique of waiting 
lists "insures non-attendance of the children, cools off the 
parent with the hope of eventual placement, and leaves the 
impression that the schools are doing something (p. 274)."
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A similar petition was charged in Massachusetts, in Barnett
V .  Greenblatt (1971), where 1,371 emotionally distrubed
children were placed on a waiting list. This case challenged
the manner in which emotionally disturbed are arbitrarily
denied the right to an education and was still pending.
In Maryland, a class action suit was brought by the
Maryland Association for Retarded Children and 14 mentally
retarded children against the state of Maryland for failure
to provide retarded or other handicapped children with an
equal and free public education. It argued that:
the opportunity of an education, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right that must be made 
available to all on equal terms (Maryland Association 
for Retarded Children v. State of Maryland, 1972Ï.
Another class action suit was introduced on May 18, 1972, 
on behalf of 13 severely and moderately mentally retarded 
children in North Carolina for failure to provide public 
education for all of the state's estimated 75,000 mentally 
retarded children. The defendants were the state, the state 
superintendent of public education, the state board of educa­
tion, the department and the secretary of the department of 
human resources, and other officials of the state. The 
plaintiffs' attorneys used the North Carolina Constitution 
and a 1967 North Carolina attorney general's opinion as 
evidence that equal educational opportunities should be 
provided for all students. On July 31, 1972, the complaint 
was expanded to include in addition to the North Carolina 
Association for Retarded Children, 22 plaintiff children who
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. . . have by the defendants been denied the right to 
a free homebound instruction or been denied the right 
of tuition or costs reimbursement in private schools 
or institutions or been denied the right of free educa­
tion, training or habilitation in institutions for 
mentally retarded (North Carolina Associâtion for 
Retarded Children, Inc. v. The State of North Carolina,
1972 1,
Another case was filed in the state of North Carolina on 
May 5, 1372, on behalf of all school age mentally retarded 
children in North Carolina (Hamilton v. Riddle, 1972). Crystal 
Rene Hamilton, an eight year old mentally retarded child, was 
admitted to the Western Carolina Center, a state institution 
for the mentally retarded, in November, 1971, on a temporary 
basis. The center notified her parents after six months that 
they would no longer provide education and treatment for the 
child. The statutes of North Carolina were said to guarantee 
equal free educational opportunities for all children of the 
state between the ages of six and twenty-one years of age.
The case was joined with North Carolina Association for 
Retarded Children, Inc. v. The State of North Carolina (1972), 
and a decision had not been reached.
The coalition for the Civil Rights of Handicapped Persons 
and twelve handicapped children filed suit against the State 
of Michigan for their failure to provide a publicly supported 
education (Harrison v. State of Michigan, 1972). The plain­
tiffs included many handicapping conditions —  brain damage, 
mild to severe mental retardation, autism, emotional disturbance, 
cerebral palsy, and hearing disorders said to represent 30,000 
to 40,000 handicapped children. The important difference in
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this suit was the reference in the complaint to a mandatory 
special education law effective July 1, 1972. The law was 
not fully implemented until the 1973-74 school years, and 
the plaintiffs were denied their rights at that time. It 
was indicated that the mandatory act did not provide manda­
tory education or the right to hearing and review as to the 
educational status of the child. On October 30, 1972, United 
States District Judge Charles W. Joiner issued an order that 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. This was done on the 
basis that the new state of Michigan mandatory legislation 
rendered the complaint moot. He rendered an opinion that pro­
vision of education for some children while not providing it 
for others was a denial for equal protection, but that a com­
prehensive plan for the education of handicapped children 
could not be resolved by a judicial order.
A case which was still pending in Wisconsin was brought 
against the state by Mindy Linda Panitch and represented a 
class of children who were multi-handicapped, educable 
children between the ages of four and twenty years (Panitch 
V .  State of Wisconsin, 1972). The issue was a Wisconsin 
statute that enabled handicapped children to attend a special 
school, class or center, outside the state and required the 
county or school district to pay tuition and transportation 
to a public institution.
As a result of the exclusion clauses in the state statutes, 
a number of handicapped children were denied an education.
The course of action taken by the plaintiffs’ attorneys was
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to prove these statutes illegal. Lori Case v. State of 
California (1972) was an example of this particular strategy. 
Lori Case was a school age child diagnosed as autistic, deaf, 
and possibly mentally retarded who was enrolled in the multi­
handicapped unit at the California School for the Deaf at 
Riverside, California, in May, 1970. After termination of 
her placement on grounds that she was severely mentally 
retarded and required custodial care beyond the provisions 
available at the school, the plaintiffs filed and were granted 
a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from inter­
fering with Lori‘s placement. The question as in other right 
to education cases was centered around Lori's educability and 
the court's definition of the term. The plaintiff's attorney 
argued:
There is absolutely no distinction in law, or in 
logic between a handicapped child and a physically 
normal child. Each is fully entitled to the equal 
protection and benefits of the laws of this State.
Thus, to deprive Lori of her right to an education 
. . . would violate her fundamental rights CLori 
Case V .  State of California, 1972).
A similar case brought in California was Burnstein v.
The Board of Education (1970) in which the plaintiffs were 
described as autistic and were not receiving a public educa­
tion. It was argued that education for children between the 
ages of six and sixteen was not a privilege but was a legal 
right under the state laws of California and the United 
States.
Another class of autistic children filed suit in August,
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1972, against the State of Virginia for their legal right to 
be provided with equal access to an education. In addition 
to the use of the "fundamental rights" violation, the plaintiffs 
in Tidewater Association for Autistic Children v. Commonwealth 
of Virginia (1972) charged that discrimination was being 
practiced against autistic children since they were educable 
and no suitable program of training or education was available 
for them. In December, 1972, the court dismissed the plain­
tiff's complaint on the grounds that the United States Consti­
tution did not explicity or implicitly guarantee the right 
to a free public education. The cour+ also explained that 
this right was guaranteed through the state laws of Virginia 
which called for the education of the handicapped. This was 
in some respect a defeat since no actual redress was 
accomplished. However, the fact that this group of handi­
capped children brought attention to the state legislation, 
school administrators, officials, parents, and the general 
public accomplished a great deal.
The threat of money damages, as in other professional 
malpractice suits, might have been the forerunner of successful 
action in these suits. In Kivell v. Nemoitin (1972), in 
Fairfield County, Connecticut, the Superior Court ordered the 
board of education to pay $13,000 in back tuition costs to 
the mother of Seith Kivell, "a perceptually handicapped child 
with learning disabilities" to pay for two years of private 
education. In the ruling the judge, in anticipation of 
similar suits being brought, noted:
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This court will frown upon any unilateral action by 
parents in sending their children to other facilities, 
if a program is filed by a local board of education 
and is accepted and approved by the state board of 
education. Then it is the duty of the parents to 
accept the program . . .  a refusal by parents in such 
a situation will not entitled their child to any 
benefits from this court (Kivell v. Nemoitin, 1972).
A case held in New York Family Court awarded the cost
of private school education to be paid by the state. Peter-
Held had been enrolled in public schools for five years,
three of which were in special education classes where his
reading level never exceeded first grade level. After one
year in private school, his reading level increased two grade
levels. The mother had previously applied for funds under
the same statutory provision but was denied. The court
ruling in November, 1971, stated:
It seems that now, for the first time in his young 
life, he has a future. This Court has the statutory 
duty to afford him an opportunity to achieve an educa­
tion CIN RE HELD, 1971, p. 71).
A class action suit was filed in late 1972 in North 
Dakota on behalf of 13 retarded and handicapped children ages 
6 to 19. Some of these children attended private schools, 
paid for by their parents, or lived in foster homes in a 
county where special education was available. Others received 
no education, attended private day care programs, or resided 
in state schools where no educational program was provided.
The complaint alleged that only about 27 percent of the 
25,000 exceptional children in North Dakota were receiving 
special services (North Dakota Association for Retarded 
Children v. Peterson, 1972). Another suit filed in December,
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1972, named 19 physically and mentally handicapped children 
as plaintiffs in a class action suit against the state of 
Colorado for failure to provide equal educational opportuni­
ties to 20,000 handicapped children (Colorado Association for 
Retarded Children v. State of Colorado, 1972).
Right to Placement
There was an increasing amount of litigation questioning
the placement of children in special education on the basis
of evaluative instruments that were prejudicial to the children
on the basis of native language, cultural background, and
normative standardization (Weintraub and Abeson, 1972). Much
of the defense in these cases was based on the Hobson v.
Hansen (1967) decision. This was the first time the use of
testing to place and label children was questioned in court.
The Washington, D. C. school system tracked children into four
groups on the basis of tests which was called tracking. Judge
Skelly Wright ruled that the tracking system was illegal and
in considering the evaluative measures used in the District
he noted in Hobson:
Evidence shows that the method by which track assign­
ments are made depends essentially on standardized 
aptitude tests which, although given on a system- 
wide basis, are completely inappropriate for use with 
a large segment of the student body. Because these 
tests are standardized primarily on and are relevant 
to a white middle class group of students, they pro­
duce inaccurate and misleading test scores when 
given to lower class and Negro students. As a result 
rather than being classified according to ability 
to learn, these students are in reality being classi­
fied according to their socio-economic or racial 
status, or -—  more precisely —  according to environ­
mental and psychological factors which have nothing 
to do with innate ability Cp. 720).
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He ordered the abolishment of the tracking system on the 
contention that it discriminated against the racially or 
economically disadvantaged and stated it was in violation of 
the United States Constitution. Ross e^ al. (1971) suggested 
that once a child was placed in a certain track the student 
was locked in because of infrequent retesting, the student's 
poor self-image, and the teacher's preconceived ideas of the 
student's academic abilities. Cruickshank (1972) suggested 
that the comments by Judge Wright were relevant to children 
with specific learning disabilities.
Another case where tracking or ability grouping was 
challenged was filed in the District Court of Southern 
California (Sprangler v. Board of Education, C1970). A 
group of black students charged that a racial imbalance 
existed because of the use of intelligence tests. The 
practice was halted due to the questionable validity of the 
tests and the decision was made without contest.
In January, 1970, a suit was filed on behalf of nine 
Mexican-Araerican public school students, aged 8 through 13, 
who claimed they had been improperly placed in special 
education classes for the mentally retarded on the basis of 
inaccurate test scores (Diana v. Board of Education, 1970). 
The children were from Spanish-speaking homes and when 
retested in Spanish, seven of the nine scored higher than 
the I.Q. qualification score for mental retardation. The 
case was settled out of court in favor of the plaintiffs.
The final order required that;
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1. Children are to be tested in their primary 
language. Interpreters may be used when a 
bilingual examiner is not available.
2. Mexican-American and Chinese children in 
classes for the educable mentally retarded 
are to be retested and evaluated.
3. The state will undertake immediate efforts 
to develop and standardize an appropriate
I.Q. test.
4. Special efforts are to be extended to aid 
misplaced children readjust to regular 
classrooms (p. 37).
As a result of Diana, the United States Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare's office for Civil Rights 
issued a memorandum that informed the districts that they 
would be in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
if students whose predominant language was other than English 
were assigned to classes for the mentally retarded on the 
basis of tests which evaluated the use of English language 
skills (Weintraub and Abeson, 1972).
The extent of the minority group language problem was 
shown by the evaluation of the percentages of culturally or 
linguistically different school age children. Approximately 
10 percent of the school age population of the United States 
spoke a native language other than English (Sabatino, Kelling 
and Hayden, 1973). Spanish named students constituted a 
significant portion of the student population, as in California 
where it was 14,4 percent and in New Mexico where they com­
prised 38 percent of the students. The American Indian, not 
including those in Bureau of Indian Affairs schools, in 
New Mexico comprised 7.3 percent of the student population.
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It was suggested that these children comprised a dispropor­
tionate number of those enrolled in special education programs. 
Another related case, Arreola v. Board of Education (1968), 
questioned the placement of Mexican-American in special educa­
tion classes and had not been settled.
In February, 1971, Covarrubias v. San Diego Unified School 
District was filed on behalf of twelve black and five Mexican- 
American pupils in classes for the mentally retarded. The 
plaintiffs relied on the attack used in Diana on the measuring 
instruments used for placement i.e., the Stanford-Binet and 
Wechsler intelligence tests. The suit stated that many minority 
students were subjected to "taunts and derisions" because of 
a "biased testing procedure that does not recognize unfamiliarity 
with white, middle-class cultural background and a lack of 
facility was English Cp. 390)." Covarrubias, although similar 
to Diana, requested that revised tests be used that recognized 
the influences of the black ghetto. Money damages were asked 
to alleviate the wrong done to the children.
The Stewart v. Phillips C1970) case in Boston argued 
that the improper placement of poor or black students abridged 
the rights to equal protection and due process. The three 
classes of plaintiffs named were all poor or black Boston 
public school students, improperly placed, denied placement, 
and all parents of students placed in special classes but 
denied participation in the placement. The plaintiffs sought 
$20,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Stewart went 
further than Covarrubias when it asked that I.Q. tests recognize
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the black culture and the influence that poverty has had on 
educational potential. A final decision had not been made, 
but subsequently Massachusetts school officials developed 
new state regulations for special class placement.
Another placement issue was tested in Arizona which 
involved the disproportionate number of bilingual children 
enrolled in classes for the mentally handicapped. This suit, 
Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v . Tempe Elementary School 
District (1972), was filed by Mexican-American and Yaqui 
Indian school children. The complaint asked that children 
in classes for the retarded be reassessed, and that the 
"defendants be enjoined from administering tests to students 
who may do poorly on them because of their cultural back­
ground (Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary 
School District, 1972)," and that no child be placed before 
the age of ten. A stipulated agreement provided for the 
consideration of cultural background, intelligence tests 
administered in the child's primary language, the parents' 
involvement in the placement, and the school's justification 
for any proportion of an ethnic group which is significantly 
greater than that group in the total school population.
In Larry P . v. Riles (1971), the plaintiffs were six 
black elementary school students from San Francisco Unified 
School District who represented a class of black children who 
alleged that they were inappropriately classified and placed 
in classes for the mentally retarded. The complaint held 
that this misplacement carried a stigma and "a life sentence 
of illiteracy and public dependency (p. 2003)." Statistical
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information indicated that a disproportionate number were
enrolled in classes for the retarded, and the plaintiffs
were retested by black psychologists who obtained I.Q.
scores which ranged from 79 to 104 which was above the
retarded level (Cohen and DeYoung, 1973). On June 20, 1972,
the court ruled:
. . .  no black student may Cin the future) be 
placed in an EMR class on the basis of criteria 
which rely primarily on the results of I.Q. tests 
as they are currently administered if the conse­
quence of use of such criteria is racial inbalance 
in the composition of EMR classes Cp. 2033).
The Larry P. case reflected the doubt that even though 
the California school code had been modified, black students 
were still misplaced and labeled mentally retarded. The 
state held that the lawsuit was filed too quickly after the 
new regulations went into effect.
Eight black children classified as mentally retarded 
brought suit against New Orleans Parish School Board on the 
basis that the classification was done arbitrarily and with­
out standards or valid reasons CLebanks v . Spears, 1971).
It was also charged that the defendants failed to provide 
educational opportunities to some retarded children. The 
plaintiffs* attorneys stated:
Continued deprivation (of education) will render 
each plaintiff and member of the class functionally 
useless in our society; each day leaves them further 
behind their more fortunate peers (Lebanks v. Spears,
1971).
In addition to appropriate classification procedures, they 
sought a $2 0,000 damage award for each plaintiff. A decision 
had not been reached.
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In Ruiz V .  State Board of Education (1971) three Mexican- 
American children filed a class action suit against the state 
of California opposing the use of I.Q. scores in their educa­
tional evaluation. The action sought relief in the form of 
prevention of the placement of group I.Q. scores in school 
records. An injunction was sought to prevent the use of group 
intelligence tests in the determination of allocation of funds.
Walton V ,  City School District of Glen Cove (1972) con­
cerned Lynn Walton, a 15 year old, who was suspended from 
regular school attendance for verbally abusing a teacher and 
refusing to follow her directions. It was alleged that the 
label "handicapped" or "emotionally disturbed" was arbitrarily 
assigned, and that it resulted in Lynn Walton being stigmatized 
as inferior and unfit. On February 4, 1972, the court granted 
the relief sought by the petitioner recognizing the school 
district's violation of procedural due process (Abeson, 1973).
A suit was filed in January, 1972, that charged that the 
district was not following the agreement set forth in Diana 
(Arnold v. Tamalpais Union High School District, 1972). They 
sought $600,000 in damages and asked compliance with the state 
education code. As reported by Cohen and DeYoung C1973), once 
rights were defined in courts perhaps additional litigation 
was required to insure the provision of those rights.
The task of assessment became a major issue in the right 
to proper placement cases. This was recognized as a complex 
endeavor in the field of education, and it caused much dis­
cussion on both sides of the issue (Kirk, 1972; Jones, 1968;
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and Segal, 1967). Involved in this issue of testing was 
the problem of free access to an educational program which 
was appropriate to the individual's needs. Lilly (1970) 
noted that although the limitations and biases were acknow­
ledged by authorities, mental ability tests were continually 
employed to make unwarranted judgments. Since a dispropor­
tionate number of minority group children appeared in the 
special class placements, Ross et al. (1971) suggested that 
special education served to highlight institutional racism 
in many institutions.
The labeling issue was a question in the placement 
lawsuits. The great hazard of misidentification and stigma 
was presented in many cases with much educational support 
cited. A study by Mercer (1973) concluded that a dispropor­
tionate number of black and Chicano children were labeled 
as mentally retarded at the mild or borderline end; and, yet 
when socio-cultural influences were considered, differences 
in measured intelligence were minimal between black and 
white children, or between children of Spanish-speaking or 
English-speaking background. The advantages and disadvantages 
of labeling were discussed by Gallagher (1972), and this 
issue provided an area that influenced the direction of 
decisions made in special education.
Parental involvement played an important role in the 
right to placement issue in that parents were not given 
adequate oportunity to participate in the placement decision.
The right to a hearing included parents' rights to attend 
decision making conferences and to be directly involved in 
the placement. Kronick (1972) and Cruickshank and Johnson
(1972) advised parents not to dump the total responsibility 
in the educator's lap. The N.A.R.C. (1971) policy statements 
reported:
It is not uncommon for educational plans to be for­
mulated without the benefit of input or goal setting 
by parents of the school children who are the con­
sumers of educational service (p. 9).
It was recognized that much time and planning on the part of
the educational system was required to actually involve the
parents, but, as indicated by the decisions in the courts, it
will be necessary in the future.
Right to Treatment 
The right to treatment was first expressed by Birnbaum 
(1960):
. . . the courts under their traditional powers to 
protect the constitutional rights of our citizens 
begin to consider the problem of whether or not a 
person who has been institutionalized solely because 
he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institu­
tionalization for care and treatment actually does 
receive adequate medical treatment so that he may 
regain his health, and therefore his liberty, as 
soon as possible; that the courts do this by means 
of recognizing and enforcing the right to treatment ; 
and, that the courts do this, independent of any 
action by any legislature, as a necessary and overdue 
process of law (p. 499).
Dr. Birnbaum's idea was that right to treatment litigation 
would result in public attention and legislative reform in this 
area. This concept was applied to the mentally retarded as well 
as the mentally ill.
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The present abuses in institutions for the retarded and 
other handicapping conditions have been exposed by the mass 
media and were supported by professional investigations (Blatt 
and Kaplan, 1966; Ricci v. Greenblatt, 1972; Wyatt v. Stickney,
1972). Evidently the legislation was not effective, as the 
court stated in Wyatt v. Stickney (1972): "The result of
almost fifty years of legislative neglect has been catas­
trophic; atrocities occur daily Cp. 781)." It was left up 
to the courts to establish the principle of the right to 
treatment. Since the majority of laymen viewed mentally 
retarded persons as falling at the lower end of the scale, 
it was difficult to convince people that the proper solution 
was in adequate treatment and possibly prevention of insti­
tutionalization. Kugel and Wolfensberger (1969), supported 
this when they said, "Few retardates need hospital treatment ; 
all need education, employment, and a satisfying social and 
cultural environment (p. 25)."
One of the most significant cases in the rights of 
retarded persons in institutions was the successful result 
of Wyatt V .  Stickney (1972). The action was filed originally 
on behalf of the residents at Bryce Hospital for the mentally 
ill, but was later extended to the patients at Searcy Hospital 
and Partlow State School for the mentally retarded. At a 
hearing in February, 1972, evidence presented prompted the 
court to issue an emergency order that required the state to 
hire 3 00 aides within 3 0 days. The court found:
. . . the evidence . . . has vividly and undisputably
portrayed Partlow State School and Hospital as a ware-
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housing institution which because of its atmosphere 
of psychological and physical deprivation, is wholly 
incapable of furnishing habilitation to the mentally 
retarded and is conducive only to the residents (p.
781).
The court granted permission for several organizations —  
the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the American Psy­
chological Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
and the American Association on Mental Deficiency —  to provide 
expert witnesses and to serve as■amici curiae, which meant 
friends of the court or interested parties but not direct 
litigants.
It was noted that the residents of Alabama's institutions 
were not only deprived of treatment, but even the most minimal 
stimulation which resulted in a deterioration of their condition 
(Mental Health Law Project, 1972). Although the conditions 
were substandard, the experts testified that they were "no 
worse than those in many of our largest and richest states 
(p. 781)."
On April 13, 1972, Judge Johnson handed down a final order 
and opinion which set minimum standards for constitutionally 
and medically required adequate treatment and established a 
detailed procedure for implementation. To implement this 
order, the court established a seven member "human rights 
committee" which included a resident of the institution. This 
was set up to review research proposals and rehabilitation 
programs and to advise and assist patients as to their legal 
rights.
An important element in the Wyatt case and in other right 
to treatment lawsuits was the right to be treated in the
56
"least restrictive setting." This meant if hospitalization 
was not absolutely necessary, a person should be treated at 
an out-patient or community health center. Due to evidence 
that long-term institutionalization was many times debilita­
ting, the least restrictive alternative approach was applied.
This allowed for the release of inappropriately confined 
patients and better treatment for those who remained. Ogg
(1973) suggested that retarded persons in the community were 
met with opposition, and obstacles to deinstitutionalizing 
retardates must be removed through community education.
A conflicting case held that there was no right to treatT. 
ment in Burnham v. State of Georgia, 1972. This was a class 
action suit filed on behalf of all patients committed to any 
of the six institutions for the mentally retarded and mentally 
ill. Judge Smith held that there was no constitutional right 
to treatment and that the treatment of involuntary patients 
was not a "justiciable issue" which meant an issue capable 
of definition and resolution by a court., He commented on 
the Wyatt decision, "this Court respectfully disagrees w,ith 
the conclusion reached by that Court in finding an affirmative 
Federal right to treatment absent a statute so requiring Cp., 133 5)." 
This case was on appeal.
In Ricci v. Greenblatt (1972) the plaintiffs were children 
in the Belchertown State School in Massachusetts and the 
Massachusetts Association for Retarded Children. A temporary 
restraining order was granted in February, 1972, which required 
"the defendants to develop comprehensive treatment plans for 
the residents which includes adequate and proper educational
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services (p. 1341).”
Two actions were filed in New York against the conditions 
at the Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded 
(New York State Association for Retarded Children v . Rockefeller 
(1972) and Parisi v. Rockefeller (1972), The suits charged 
widespread physical abuse, overcrowding, involuntary servitude, 
insufficient staffing, and absence of therapeutic care. The 
court was asked to set constitutionally minimal standards of 
care. The plaintiffs cited that 82.7 percent received no 
school classes, 98.3 percent were not receiving pre-vocational 
training, and 97.1 percent received no vocational training 
at Willowbrook. The court issued a restraining order which 
prohibited transfer of residents to other state institutions.
Another case was still pending which involved six plain­
tiffs in Minnesota's state hospitals for the mentally retarded 
(Welsch V .  Likins, 1972). It was charged that the plaintiffs 
and others similarly situated were not provided with, a humane 
psychological and physical environment. The buildings were 
described as "old, poorly designed and hazardous" and did not 
meet health and safety standards. A comprehensive treatment 
plan was recommended and a requirement that defendants "pay 
plaintiffs and the class they represent working in the named 
institutions the minimum wage established pursuant to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act" was requested, A similar suit was 
filed in Nebraska by five mentally retarded residents in 
Beatrice State Home for the Mentally Retarded (Horaeek v.
Exon, 1972). The allegations and relief sought resembled
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the previous cases cited, and a motion to dismiss the charges 
was filed by the defendants. This motion was similar to the 
court's decision in Burnham v. Department of Public Health.
Arguments Presented in Litigation 
The legal rights of handicapped children were tested 
through litigation and basic arguments presented in these 
cases evolved. Testing, labeling, and placement were asserted 
as being injurious and placing a stigma on handicapped children 
which resulted in their separation from the mainstream of 
regular education. This entire process, including the measure­
ment instruments used for diagnosis, were attacked and the 
arguments used were outlined by Ross, DeYoung, and Cohen (1971).
The first argument asserted that standardized intelligence 
tests that had white middle-class students as the population 
sample did not accurately measure the learning ability of the 
plaintiffs. The tests' heavy reliance on verbal ability and 
standard English were stated to be non-representative of many 
classes of children. As Ross et C1973) stated:
. . . the test scores often are used as the primary, 
if not sole, criterion for establishing a diagnosis 
of mentaly retardation —  with all the consequences 
of such a diagnosis Cp. 5).
Thus, the argument presented made a case for the tests as 
discriminatory against children of racial and cultural 
minorities and in violation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on the Jensen report 
(.1969), Hall (1970) asserted that there were possibly IS 
times as many black children as white children in classes
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for the mentally retarded. Dunn (1968) agreed when he
hypothesized that minority children constituted over half
of those placed in special education.
A related argument contended that the administration
of tests was frequently performed incompetently. The basis
for this objection was that many public school personnel were
not prepared to administer or interpret the tests due to a
lack of knowledge of the cultural background and language
unfamiliarity. Even the most skilled examiner was said to
be incompetent in this regard.
The third agrument dealt with the lack of parental
involvement in the placement procedure. Typically, the
parents were informed by school officials after a decison
was reached. Cohen and DeYoung C1973) cited:
Professional educators should not be permitted to 
'con' parents into agreeing with the change of 
status of the student after a decision has been 
made to place him in a special class Cp., 267).
The parents were not informed that the child, once labeled 
and placed in a special education class, would in most 
instances remain there throughout his school career.
Another argument offered was related to the programs 
available in special education. This argument directly 
questioned the entire field of special educational practices 
and its administration. The vocational and educational skills 
provided were found inadequate and unsuccessful. The special 
class was described by Cohen and DeYoung C1973) as an "educa­
tional burial ground insuring lower socioeconomic status for 
its students (p. 267)."
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The final argument defended the position that improper 
placement in special classes caused personal harm to the 
exceptional child's self-concept. The psychological damage 
created by improper placement was impossible to measure 
with tests or instruments, but it undoubtedly had a far 
reaching effect. This stigmatization did not end with 
school experiences, but was a lasting effect throughout 
the life of the handicapped citizen.
The five basic arguments presented by Ross e;t a^. (1971), 
were tested in the various lawsuits regarding the rights of 
handicapped children, and in recent years public opinion had 
had "tremendous influence in the outcome of the litigation 
procedures Cp. 12)." According to the Mental Health Law 
Project (1973), the mentaly health advocates, lawyers, educa­
tors, and civil libertarians began to recognize that alleged 
exceptional children were one of the most profoundly victimized 
minorities in this country. The recent lawsuits have provided 
a "window on the plight of an otherwise forgotton group (p. 2)."
Throughout this portion of the investigation, it was 
shown that litigation was generally effective in providing 
exceptional children access to their constitutional or 
statutory rights. This procedure was first initiated in 
1967, and several landmark cases since then have, provided 
prototypes for the following cases which concerned the rights 
of handicapped children. The lawsuits were divided into 
general categories with the separate areas of focus providing 
the basis for this delineation. The first area considered
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was the recognition by the courts that all children were 
to be provided free access to an education, i.e. the right 
to education cases. Another category dealt with the place­
ment practices which included the improper classification of 
handicapped children —  the right to placement. The third 
area reported was the right to treatment in institutions for 
the mentally retarded. The outcome of many of these lawsuits 
was still pending, but it appeared clear that litigation of 
the rights of exceptional children was in many instances a 
successful means of obtaining redress for grievances.
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND IMPLICATIONS
The problem of this study was to investigate the rela­
tionship between the alleged abridgement of handicapped 
children's rights and litigation as an avenue for change.
An attempt was made to clarify the nature of this relation­
ship through a systematic analysis of the cases according 
to their content. The procedure associated with the collection 
of the data were those involving the location, examination, 
and analysis of available and accessible published materials 
located in libraries and selected governmental agencies.
The analysis provided information for answering the 
questions proposed at the outset of this study.
1. What was the relationship between handicapped 
children's rights and the current litigation?
The litigation regarding the rights of handicapped 
children resulted in the much needed change in attitude 
toward all areas of special education. The successful out­
come of the court cases indicated that exceptional children 
were to be accorded their full statutory rights.
2. What was the relationship between court decisions 
regarding handicapped children and the traditional 
means of providing treatment and education?
The inadequate provision of programs and treatment in 
some instances and the denial of education were no longer 
permitted as an outcome of these lawsuits. The basic premise
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that all children, which included all exceptional children 
regardless of their handicapping condition were truly 
educable, was usually established in the successful litiga­
tion.
3. What were the general categories and patterns of 
the existing litigation?
The existing patterns in the lawsuits regarding handi­
capped children were delineated into three major categories: 
a) right to education, b) right to proper placement, and 
c) right to treatment. The recognition by the courts that 
all children should be provided free access to an education 
was one of the central issues in the court cases. Another 
major category dealt with the placement practices which 
included the improper classification of handicapped children 
in special education programs. The mass media exposed inhumane 
treatment in institutions for the mentally retarded and
provided an impetus for action in the third area of emphasis
which was the right to treatment for the institutionalized 
handicapped.
k. What were the aspects of the court rulings that
presented probe1ms to the field of special educa­
tion?
When the court handed down a decision regarding the right 
to education, educators had to act quickly to locate and provide 
an education for all exceptional children in their respective 
state. Generally, a deadline was set requiring placement and 
evaluation of all exceptional children. This was a mammoth
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task which required additional psychometrists, psychologists, 
special class teachers, and other resource personnel.
It was suggested previously that the legal actions in 
regard to handicapped children be viewed as one form of 
accountability. This term became a reality for special 
educators and those in special services when the courts were 
forced to speak on the issue of adequate educational provisions 
for exceptional children;. The pressure which had been placed 
on all educators in recent years to be held accountable was 
applied also to personnel in special education as a result 
of the litigation.
Litigation provided stimulation toward pre*-school pro­
gramming for exceptional children where none had been pre­
viously offered. Due to many of the state statutes which 
did not require or excluded the pre-school age child, it was 
difficult to locate handicapped children at this age level.
The entire issue of labeling and proper classification 
of exceptional children posed problems in the field of special 
education. For many years, classification and placement in 
a self-contained class had been generally accepted. The 
courts in some cases banned the use of culturally biased 
testing procedures and held that programs based on the indi­
vidual child's learning needs must be provided. Consequently, 
mainstreaming became the trend in providing an appropriate 
education for all exceptional children, i.e. to keep the 
exceptional children in the mainstream of education rather 
than to isolate them in special classes.
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The right to treatment created a need to alter the 
practices in institutions with respect to the concept of 
the right to treatment in the least restrictive setting.
The evidence presented indicated that institutionalization 
itself could lead to deterioration of exceptional children.
It was found necessary to provide treatment within the 
community, i.e. in sheltered workshops and community health 
centers where appropriate treatment and education for all 
exceptional individuals were available.
5. What was the legal basis and precedent established 
in the lawsuits regarding the handicapped?
The answer to this question, as applied to all categories 
of lawsuits, was established by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States. The Constitutional 
provisions which supplied the legal support for the arguments 
were due process and equal protection of the law. Due process 
entitled all citizens, as well as handicapped citizens, the 
right to be treated in a fair manner; and the equal protection 
provision prohibited the government from unfair discrimination 
against an individual or class of individuals.
6. What were the arguments presented in the complaints 
that were filed?
One argument asserted that intelligence tests standardized 
on white middle-class students were not applicable to minority 
group students. A related argument contended that the adminis­
tration of the tests were performed inadequately by examiners 
who were not familiar with various cultural backgrounds. The
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next argument dealt with the need for more parental involve­
ment in placement decisions. Many rulings required that 
parents be asked to attend a due process hearing or a decision­
making meeting where they could become involved in the decision 
process prior to educational placement. Another argument 
questioned the availability of special education programs.
Many children were placed on waiting lists and denied 
indefinitely equal access to an education. The final argu­
ment maintained that improper placement not only led to 
stigmatization but a poor self-concept that affected the 
entire life of the exceptional child.
7. What were the functions of litigation?
The first function of litigation involved securing equal 
access to education for all exceptional children. The creation 
of a new forum where advocates of handicapped children's 
rights could express their opinions was provided. Another 
use of the litigation was found in gathering public attention 
and support. The improvement of the exceptional child's self- 
concept to the extent that they viewed themselves as worthy 
individuals with all the rights that normal children were 
afforded proved to be an important use of litigation.
8. What role did state and Federal legislation play 
in the litigation procedure?
The enactment of legislation and its significance upon 
the legal rights of exceptional children were not underestimated. 
It must be noted that a law was generally not enforced if it 
did not have public support. Legislation at the national and
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state level provided a basis for the growing trend to provide 
equal rights to the handicapped. Where legislation failed 
to provide these rights, the judicial system was called upon 
to make these decisions. The source of funding was found 
in legislation, and it was held in several cases that lack 
of funds or resources could not be used as an excuse when 
normal children were provided with an education and exceptional 
children were excluded.
9. What were the implications for the leadership in 
the field of special education?
At the University level programs needed to be implemented 
in the preparation of educators and psychologists in the 
field of special education that emphasized educational alter­
natives other than the self-contained classroom and the I.Q. 
score placement procedure. Ross et a2. (1973) focused the 
need to show the interactive nature of behavior in relation 
to the child's family and community. The special educator 
in the future may act as a consultant to the exceptional 
child and regular classroom teacher rather than as a special 
class teacher. Awareness of the issue and evidence used in 
the lawsuits needed to be conveyed at the level of higher 
education in order to prepare for these changes which were 
occurring in the field. If educators objected to the judicial 
system that assumed the responsibility of providing equal 
access to education and treatment of exceptional children, 
they needed to take an active role in providing it from 
within the system.
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As a result of the gross injustice that existed in the 
education and treatment of handicapped children, there were 
over thirty lawsuits filed in their behalf. These lawsuits 
expressed the growing concern on the part of many people 
that handicapped ditizens' rights had been abridged, and 
the time had come to provide an avenue for change. Presently, 
the field of special education is in the midst of transition, 
and it is important that leadership in the area provide 
direction in the form of information and research on the 
problems encountered.
The legal rights of the mentally retarded and other 
exceptional children had been denied for many years. As 
other minority groups had done in the past, they took their 
complaints to court when other avenues were unsuccessful.
The courts decided favorably toward these issues in many 
cases, and the legal rights of exceptional individuals were 
recognized.
State and national legislation provided for specific 
rights of the handicapped, but many times these laws were 
not enforced. Where no other recourse was available, handi­
capped children with the help of parents and supportive 
organizations filed suit in a state or Federal court.
The public acceptance of handicapped children within 
the last few years made the passage of legislation and 
successful litigation possible. It is now time for educators 
to become aware of judicial decisions and their implications 
for the education and treatment of all handicapped children.
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Implications for Further Research 
Since court decisions are constantly being made, future 
research might include the current status of the litigation 
regarding handicapped citizens. The entire issue of labeling 
and the resultant stigma attached to it, needs further research. 
It became apparent in this study that alternate approaches in 
the evaluation of exceptional children was needed. The financial 
provisions available in this area provided an important factor 
which needed further study. As noted in the literature, there 
was a sparcity of specific research studies in the area of 
special education administration and special services. More 
appropriate training and the development of educational pro­
grams for special educators was warranted as well as continued 
study of the human and legal rights of all children.
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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Con the report of the Third Committee (A/8588))
2858 (XXVI). Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons
The General Assembly,
Mindful of the pledge of the States Members of the United 
Nations under the Charter to take joint and separate action in 
co-operation with the Organization to promote higher standards 
of living, full employment and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development.
Reaffirming faith in human rights and fundamental free­
doms and in the principles of peace, of the dignity and worth 
of the human person and of social justice proclaimed in the 
Charter,
Recalling the principles of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenants of Human Rights, 
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child and the standards 
already set for social progress in the constitutions, conven­
tions , recommendations and resolutions of the International 
Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the 
United Nations Children's Fund and of other organizations con­
cerned .
Emphasizing that the Declaration of Social Progress and 
Development has proclaimed the necessity of protecting the 
rights and assuring the welfare and rehabilitation of the 
physically and mentally disadvantaged.
Bearing in mind the necessity of assisting mentally 
retarded persons to develop their abilities in various fields 
of activity and of promoting their integration as far as 
possible in normal life.
Aware that certain countries, at their present stage of 
development, can devote only limited efforts to this end,
Proclaims this Declaration on the Rights of Mentally 
Retarded Persons and calls for national and international
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action to ensure that it will be used as a common basis 
and frame of reference for the protection of these rights:
1. The mentally retarded person has, to the maximum
degree of feasibility, the same rights as other human beings.
2. The mentally retarded person has a right to proper 
medical care and physical therapy and to such education, 
training, rehabilitation and guidance as will enable him to 
develop his ability and maximum potential.
3. The mentally retarded person has a right to economic
security and to a decent standard of living. He has a right
to perform productive work or to engage in any other meaning­
ful occupation to the fullest possible extent of his capabili­
ties .
4. Whenever possible, the mentally retarded person 
should live with his own family or with foster parents and 
participate in different forms of community life. The family 
with which he lives should receive assistance. If care in
an institution becomes necessary, it should be provided in 
surroundings and other circumstances as close as possible to 
those of normal life.
5. The mentally retarded person has a right to a qualified 
guardian when this is required to protect his personal well­
being and interests.
6. The mentally retarded person has a right to protec­
tion from exploitation, abuse and degrading treatment. If 
prosecuted for any offense, he shall have a right to due 
process of law with full recognition being given to his degree 
of mental responsibility.
7. Whenever mentally retarded persons are unable, because 
of the severity of their handicap, to exercise all their rights 
in a meaningful way or it should become necessary to restrict 
or deny some or all of these rights, the procedure used for 
that restriction or denial of rights must contain proper legal 
safeguards against every form of abuse. This procedure must
be based on an evaluation of the social capability of the 
mentally retarded person by qualified experts and must be 
subject to periodic review and to the right of appeal to higher 
authorities.
2027th plenary meeting, 20 December 1971.
APPENDIX B
STATE PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED 
DEFINITIONS AND AGE REQUIREMENTS
DEFINITION Minimum Maximum
ALABAMA
Includes but no limited to the mild and 
moderately to severely retarded but not 
profoundly retarded; deaf and hearing im­
paired; blind and vision impaired ; the 
crippled and those having other handicaps 
not specifically mentioned; the emotionally 
conflicted; the socially maladjusted; those 
with specific learning disabilities, the 
multiple handicapped and the intellectually 
gifted
ALASKA
Educable mentally retarded, trainable 
mentally retarded, physically handicapped 
emotionally handicapped, learning disabled, 
gifted, and multiple handicapped
ARIZONA
Gifted; educable mentally handicapped, 
emotionally handicapped, homebound or 
hospitalized; multiple handicapped ; physi­
cally handicapped ; specific learning dis­
abled, speech handicapped; trainable 
handicapped
ARKANSAS
Retarded ; hard of hearing ; deaf ; speech 
impaired ; visually handicapped ; emotionally 
disturbed; crippled; specific learning dis­
abilities or other health impaired children 
requiring special education and related 
services— mental, physical, emotional or 
learning problems requires special educa­
tion services. This term is to be speci­
fically interpreted to mean but not wholly 
limited to the mentally retarded, hard of 
hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually 
handicapped, emotionally disturbed, crippled, 
specific learning disabled, or other health 
impaired children who by reason thereof 
require special education and related 
services.
*If the state activates a kindergarten pro­








Deaf or hard of hearing; blind or partially 
seeing; orthopedically or health impaird; 
aphasie; speech handicapped; other minors 
with a physical illness or condition making 
attendance in regular classes impossible or 
inadvisable; minor with physical impairments 
so severe as to require instruction in 
remedial physical education; multiple handi­
capped; physically handicapped ; 
educationally handicapped and mentally retarded
COLORADO
Physically handicapped 3
Educable mentally handicapped 5
Educationally handicapped (emotionally handi­




Mentally retarded; physically handicapped; 
socially or emotionally maladjusted; neuro- 
logically impaired; learning disable or 
extraordinary learning ability or outstand­
ing talent in the creative arts 5*
^Handicapped children beginning at age 3 
may receive special education services if 
their additional attainment would be 
irreparable damaged without it.












Physically handicapped, maladjusted, 
mentally handicapped, learning disabled 
gifted, and talented
FLORIDA
Educable mentally retarded, trainable 
mentally retarded, speech impaired, deaf, 
hard of hearing, blind, partially sighted, 
crippled and other health impaired, gifted, 
emotionally disturbed, socially maladjusted, 
specific learning disabled
GEORGIA
Mentally retarded, physically handicapped, 
speech handicapped, multiply handicapped, 
autistic, intellectually gifted, hearing 
impaired, visually impaired, and any other 





Special program: A preschool program with
no age limitations is authorized for the 
deaf, hearing impaired, and speech handi­
capped
HAWAII
Children who deviate in physical, mental, 
social or emotional characteristics to the 
extent that specialized training, techni­






Includes but not limited to physically 
handicapped mentally retarded, emotionally 
disturbed, chronically ill, perceptually 
impaired, visually or auditory handicapped, 
speech impaired, and academically talented
ILLINOIS
Physically handicapped, children with 
learning disabilities, maladjusted 
children, educable mentally handicapped, 
trainable mentally handicapped, speech 
defective, and multiply handicapped
INDIANA
Physical or mentally disability as defined 
by regulations and includes the multiply 
handicapped
IOWA
Crippled, defective sight, hard of hearing, 
speech impairments, heart disease, tuber­
culosis, physical defects, emotionally mal­
adjusted, and children intellectually 
incapable of regular instructional programs 
*Children not in state institutions under 
age 5 may receive services 
**Programs may be extended for three years 
for persons who, because of a congenital 
defect, accident, or prolonged illness, are 
unable to complete special education require­
ments by the age 21.
no lower limit 







Developmentally disabled, homebound, crippled, 
hard of hearing, socially and emotionally 
maladjusted, defective sight or speech, 
cerebral palsy, delicate Cincluding heart 
conditions), tubercular, intellectually gifted, 
and those children who have been found by
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KANSAS cont’d Minimum Maximum
a competent authority to be best educated 
by special instruction from a special
teacher on a full or part time basis birth 21*
♦Programs may be extended for three years
for persons who, because of a congenital
defect, accident or prolonged illness,
are unable to complete special education
requirements by age 21.
KENTUCKY
Neurologically impaired, intellectually 
gifted; emotionally disturbed, functionally 
retarded, children with learning disabilities 
or communication, disorders, multiply handi­
capped, physically handicapped, speech 
defective and educable and trainable mentally
retarded birth 21
LOUISIANA
Physically handicapped, mentally handicapped, 
and other exceptional children including 
slow learners, educable and trainable mentally 
retarded, deaf and hard of hearing, speech 
impaired, blind, and/or partially sighted, 
emotionally disturbed, cerebral palsied, 
gifted, children with learning disabilities,
crippled, and other health impaired children 3 21
MAINE
Children able to benefit from an instructional
program but who cannot be provided for in
regular programs because of physical or mental
deviations 5 20
MARYLAND
Physically and mentally handicapped 6 18
Special program: Children under age 6 may
receive special services if such services
would help them to approach a degree of
development similar to pupils in regular
school programs
MASSACHUSETTS
School age child who because of temporary 
or more permanent adjustment difficulties 
or attributes arising from intellectual, 
sensory, emotional or physical factors, 
cerebral dysfunctions, perceptual factors, 
or other learning disabilities or any com­
bination of these who is unable to make 




Handicapped including but are not limited to 
mental, physical, emotional, behavioral, 
sensory, and speech handicaps
MINNESOTA
Deaf, hard of hearing, blind, partially 
seeing, crippled, speech defective or other­
wise physically impaired in body or limb 
so that special education is needed; 




Defective hearing, vision, speech, mental 
retardation, physical conditions
MISSOURI
Children who deviate from the average in 
physical, mental, or social developmental 
characteristics to the extent that they 
require special education services 
^Children may be enrolled in existing or 
approvable kingergarten programs
MONTANA
Physically handica.pped, includes but not 
limited to cardiac, cerebral palsy, speech 
defective, and hearing and vision handi­
capped, educable mentally retarded 
Trainable mentally handicapped 
Custodial mentally handicapped 
State school for the deaf and blind
NEBRASKA
Trainable mentally retarded, physically 
handicapped crippled, visually handicapped, 
hard of hearing, speech defective, cardio­
pathie, tubercular, cerebral palsied or 
otherwise physically handicapped, educable 
mentally retarded, multiply handicapped, 
emotionally disturbed.
NEVADA
Vision, hearing, speech, orthopedic, mental, 
and neurological disorders or defects, or . 


















legal school age 
no longer 











Mentally retarded, visually handicapped, 
auditorily handicapped, communication 
handicapped, neurologically or perceptually 
impaired, orthopedically handicapped, 
chronically ill, emotionally disturbed, 
socially maladjusted, and multiply handi­
capped
Program may be conducted on a permissive 
basis to children under 5 and over 20 if 





Exceptional children are children whose 
abilities render regular services in the 
public school inconsistent with their 
educational needs
NEW YORK
Children who because of mental, physical, 
or emotional reasons cannot be educated 
in regular classes
NORTH CAROLINA
For handicapped, crippled, other classes 








Children with physical, mental, emotional, 
or social conditions with an educable mind 21
OHIO
Defective hearing and vision, crippled, 
trainable mentally retarded, educable 
mentally retarded, emotionally handi­
capped
OKLAHOMA
Gifted, educable mentally retarded, trainable 
mentally retarded, speech defective, emotionally 
disturbed, perceptually handicapped, children 
with special health problems, children requiring 
services of a visiting counselor, specifically 
learning disabled as a result of neurological 
impairment, multiply handicapped 
Deaf blind, blind and partially blind, hard of 
hearing and deaf
*If the physical condition prevents a child 
from completing his program by age 21, 








Blind, deaf, partially sighted, hard of 
hearing, speech defective, crippled or 
physically handicapped, extreme learning 
problems, unwed pregnant or unwed mother 
with a child in her care, neurologically 
handicapped, emotionally handicapped, 
trainable mentally retarded 
Educable mentally retarded
PENNSYLVANIA
Children who deviate from the average in 
physical, mental, emotional, or social 
characteristics should extend that they 
need education facilities or services. All 








Mentally retarded, physically handicapped, 
and emotionally handicapped
SOUTH CAROLINA
Educable mentally retarded, trainable 
mentally retarded, emotionally handicapped, 
orthopedically handicapped, physically 




Physical or mental conditions that cannot 
be adequately provided for through the 
regular public schools
TENNESSEE
Educable, trainable, and profoundly retarded, 
the speech and/or language impaired, the 
deaf and hearing impaired, the blind and 
visually limited, the physically handicapped 
and/or other health impairments including 
homebound, hospitalized, pregnant. The 
learning disabled includes the perceptually 
handicapped, the emotionally conflicted, 
functionally retarded, socially maladjusted, 
emotionally handicapped, intellectually 
gifted, and any other child whose needs 
cannot be met in the regular classroom 
setting
TEXAS
Hard of hearing, orthopedically handicapped, 
physically handicapped, mentally retarded, 
emotionally disturbed, language or learning 
disabled
21






Exceptionally physical or mental condition 
VERMONT
Physical or mental deviations 
VIRGINIA
Mentally retarded, physically handicapped, 
emotionally disturbed, learning disabled, 
speech impairment, hearing impaired, 
mentally handicapped or otherwise handi­
capped
WASHINGTON
Temporary or permanent in normal educational 
processed because of a physical or mental 
handicap or emotional maladjustment or any 
other handicap or children with specific 
language or learning disabilities resulting 
from perceptual motor problems and visual 
and auditory perception and integration 
^Programs may be provided to children on 
preschool level
WEST VIRGINIA
Visually impaired, physically handicapped, 
orthopedically handicapped, epileptic, 
mentally retarded, speech handicapped, 
multiply handicapped, autistic, intellectually 
gifted, socially or emotionally maladjusted 
(including the delinquent), learning dis­
abled both physically and psychologically, 
and others which may be identified by the 
state superintendent of free schools 
*Programs may be conducted on a permissive 
basis for children aged 3-6
WISCONSIN
Crippled, cardiac, visually handicapped, 
auditorily handicapped, speech handicapped, 
mentally retarded, and otherwise physically 
handicapped
WYOMING
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TABLE 1



















2,440,500 69,800 348,600 52,300 348,600 40,900 697,300 1,697,500 1 ,,388,000 7,083,500
Note. -- Estimates on the number of children served and unserved 1971-1972, Fiscal 
Year Projected Activities, Bureau of Education for the Handicapped —  United States 
Office or Education (Washington, D . C ., 1971)
TABLE 2
Handicapped Children Served and Unserved
IMPAIRED
*
CRIPPLED HARD 0^ MULTIPLE LEARNING MENTAt.L)' EMOTIONALLY




DISABLED RETARDED DISTURBED TOTAL
A 1,360,203 30,630 182,636 55,624 43,915 9,310 166,534 872,213 156,486 2,857,551





‘Note» -- Estimates on the number of children served and unserved 1971-1972, Fiscal 
Year Projected Activities, Bureau of Education for the Handicapped —  United States 
Office of Education (Washington, D . C ., 1971).
